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The article discusses some of the more common legal issues involved in bone marrow
transplantation. These include malpractice claims, testing prospective donors for AIDS, sale of
bone marrow, informed consent for both donor and recipient, and questions that arise when the
donor is a child.
Legal problems involved in organ transplantation are few and far between [1]. The
number ofcases involving any sort ofissue about transplantation is far fewer than one
might expect from the numbers of cases involving most other aspects of health care
delivery.
MALPRACTICE
Medical malpractice actions involving anysort oftransplantation areextremely rare
[2]. There are none that can be located involving bone marrow transplantation. Three
or four in all the United States involve malpractice actions by kidney donors, all of
whom seem to have developed serious complications (such as life-threatening infec-
tions) following removal oftheir kidneys [3]. A few recipients ofkidneys and eyes have
brought malpractice actions, but, given the number oftransplants and the incidence of
malpractice suits in other types of medical care, the numbers are still far below what
one would expect to find. One case [4] involved a plaintiffwho had received a corneal
transplant from a patient who had died of an infection. The plaintiff, who went
completely blind following the surgery, proved that the hospital where the cornea was
harvested had donevirtually nothing to screen donors. Expert testimony was presented
and notcontradicted that patients with somespecific diseases should never be accepted
as organ donors; the dead patient from whom the cornea had been removed had more
than one ofthose diseases. The resident who removed the eyes had no idea ofthe cause
ofdeath and had no information about the patient's medical history. The hospital was
found liable. Of course a donor (of blood or anything else) must be appropriately
screened, and failure todo so is negligence.
AIDS
Nowadays, of course, the issue of screening donors usually involves questions of
screening for AIDS. Connecticut has enacted a statute [5] requiring informed consent
to HIV testing, confidentiality of HIV-related information and pre- and post-test
counseling. An exception to the consent requirement is found in Section 2e (2) when
the testing is "in relation to the procuring, processing, distributing or use of a human
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body or human body part" for research, therapy, or for transplantation. If consent is
obtained, however, counseling must be provided.
There is probably noexcuse, however, for failing totell a livingdonor-whether it be
of blood, bone marrow, sperm, ova, or other tissue or fluid-that HIV testing will be
done. Prospective donors may change their minds once they reflect on the social and
economic consequences of a positive test result that will appear on whatever medical
record they will have accumulated at the institution atwhich they would havedonated.
No federally funded clinical research that requires screening for AIDS may omit
informing prospective subjects that they will be screened [6]. If the transplantation
program receives federal funding, regardless of any exemptions under state law,
compliance with federal regulations is required.
A situation to which health professionals who counsel potential donors must be
particularly sensitive is the situation in which a prospective donor, a family member of
acritically ill person, is ina riskgroupaboutwhich therestofthefamily does not know.
There may be subtle and sometimes not-so-subtle pressure on everyone in the family to
be tested for compatibility, and the person may be afraid to speak up about why he or
she could be HIV-positive. Plausible and uninformative reasons to be given to the rest
ofthe family for not accepting as a donor the person who does not wish to have AIDS
testing should be devised in advance ofsuch a situation.
SALE OF BONE MARROW
Although the sale of organs has been a serious concern of lawyers and ethicists for
many years [7], many authorities felt that the obvious exploitation of the desperately
poor which could result if people were allowed to sell their kidneys was not present in
the sale of a "replenishable" organ such as blood. Bone marrow is, of course,
replenishable, but theNational Organ Transplant Act [8] includes bone marrow in the
listoforgans which one may not buy orsell in interstate commerce [9]. The penalty for
such purchase or transfer includes a fineofnot more than $50,000 or imprisonment for
not more than five years or both.
Since the National Organ Transplant Act only applies when interstate commerce is
involved, it is not relevant to a transaction between two residents ofthe state in which
the transplant occurs. Probably it would not apply either to a situation in which a
person from another state came to a transplant center to provide the bone amrrow and
the packaged marrow did not cross a state line. Some states have enacted their own
statutes to prohibit intrastate sale of organs [10]; these may or may not include bone
marrow.
INFORMED CONSENT
The doctrine of informed consent requires that any patient be sufficiently informed
about contemplated medical procedures so that he or she may make an intelligent and
autonomous decision to have or to refuse an intervention [11]. The necessity for
disclosure increases as the gravity ofthe patient's condition decreases-if a patient is
critically ill and there is only one possible therapy, as long as the physician has been
told by the patient to "do everything," the need for detailed discussion diminishes. On
the other hand, a patient who presents for cosmetic surgery must know all the possible
risks and alternatives in somedetail.
Informing a patient about an elective procedure includes a discussion of the
procedure and what it entails in terms ofdiscomfort, length oftime in the hospital, size
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of scars, and all other information the "reasonable person" would want to know. Risks
must be spelled out, although which risks are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient
to demand disclosure is not always easy to determine. Benefits (if any) must also be
explained. In the case of a healthy donor, ofcourse, the benefit is psychic, not physical.
Alternatives (if any) must also be presented, along with the risks and benefits ofeach.
Any donor, ofcourse, is a healthy individual who will derive no medical benefit from
the donation. He or she, therefore, must be told about all known risks and, in detail,
what to expect. When the donor is a competent adult, this discussion is usually not a
problem. The patient, too, must give informed consent to receiving the transplant and,
it seems, a part of the consent process in these cases is a frank discussion of the
economics involved, both short-term and long-term. Some insurance companies and
HMOs cover transplantation, other do not, and the patient may prefer to forego the
procedure rather than to have his or her family saddled with debt even ifthe procedure
is likely to be successful.
CHILDREN AS DONORS
If a minor is going to be a kidney donor, it is customary to ask for a court order
approving the donation [12]. Almost all courts have granted these orders, based on the
idea that the donor child derives benefit from the continued life ofthe sick sibling. The
courts' theory is that a child derives more benefit from a happy home and the sibling
relationship than he or she would from growing up with two kidneys [13]. Other courts
have dispensed with this concept of benefit and have simply found that parents are
allowed to consent to donation by one healthy child to a sick child on the basis of a
familial cost-benefit analysis [14].
The Louisiana courts, however, refused to permit a severely retarded minor, whose
capacity for relationships was marginal at best, to donate a kidney for his adult sister.
The reasoning was that it would make very little difference to the boy if his sister was
alive or dead [15].
The reason that court orders have been requested is that parents who are torn
between the welfare of a critically ill child and one who is well are not in a position to
give an objective consent to putting the donor child at risk. Not only does removal ofa
kidney involve risk, but there is some risk inherent in the donor's going through life
with one kidney.
Since bone marrow regenerates, however, the long-term risks are entirely different
from the issues present in kidney donations by minors. As far as can be determined,
lawyers for institutions in which bone marrow transplants aredone see no reason toask
for court permission in these cases. That conclusion assumes, however, that a child who
is old enough to discuss and understand the donation procedure but who objects to
being a donor is not coerced into agreeing to the procedure. Although there might be
circumstances, although difficult to envision, under which it would be appropriate to
draft one child in the family, over his or her objections, to save the life of a sibling, in
the face ofobjection by the donor, most lawyers would insist on a court order to protect
both the physician and the institution from actions for assault and battery when the
donor comes ofage. The likelihood that a court would order an unwilling young person
to serve as a bone marrow donor when it is clear that no adult can be so compelled is
quite small.
Since an adolescent, even though a minor, may very well understand as much as an
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adult about donation but minors as a class of persons cannot give a legally valid
"consent," we speakofthe adolescent's agreement as "assent."
If the child is too young to understand the procedure, as with any other medical
decision, the parents would have the authority to consent.
An adult may refuse treatment even if death is a certain result [16]. If a parent
refuses life-saving therapy for a minor (such as a Jehovah's Witness who is refusing a
blood transfusion for hertoddler who has been hit by a car), courts routinelyorder such
medical care to be given [17]. As far as can be determined, no court anywhere in this
country, Canada, or Great Britain has ever refused to order blood transfusions
requested by the child's physician, and most other forms oftherapy designed to save a
child's life or prevent serious disability are almost always ordered as well.
Court-ordered donations are, however, anotherquestion entirely. This issue has been
raised at least once in a situation in Washington State. The Child Welfare Department
considered trying to obtain a court order to require parents ofa three-year-old to have
him tested to see ifhe could be a bone marrow donor for his seven-year-old sister. The
parents had decided that they did not wish to subject their young son to the procedure
and therefore there was no need to have him tested for compatibility. The Child
Welfare Department's lawyer advised them that such an attempt would be futile, so
the matter was dropped.
Several cases havedealtwith adults who haveattempted to force their relatives to be
tested for bone marrow compatibility [18]. In all ofthem, the courts held that theword
"donation" means "gift" and that one cannot obtain court orders to compel gifts. The
courts also pointed out that no one's body can be used compulsorily for the benefit of
another.
In one famous case from Iowa [19], a man who was close to death and could not find
a bone marrow donor discovered from an employee at the University ofIowa Registry
that somewhere, according to their records, existed a woman who apparently would be
a perfect match. She had been typed because her son needed bone marrow. When the
Registry contacted heron twooccasions and asked ifshe would be willing to be a donor
for this unrelated patient, she declined. The man then sued to compel the Director of
the Registry to release her name and address so that he (the patient) could contact her
directly and beg for her help. Both the trialjudge and the Supreme CourtofIowa held
that release ofa donor's name and address without her consent would be an invasion of
her privacy, and thus the patient had no right to this information.
Moreover, in any procedure covered by federal regulations for human subjects
research, informed consent requirements state that the prospective subject has the
right to refuse toparticipate [20] without loss ofbenefits towhich heor she isotherwise
entitled. No court, therefore, has the authority to compel such participation, and no
physician may make future medical care contingent on "cooperation" with the
donation. If adults cannot be compelled by courts to be donors, even for their own
children, it is even less likely that a parent's refusal to permit his child to be a donor
would ever be overridden by a court.
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